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MR. KEYTE:  Good morning, everybody.   
This is the 45th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy.  I think it’s 
my fifth year as Director.  Barry Hawk will be hopping 
around here somewhere. 
We started the Economics Workshop four years 
ago.  The notion is to have young lawyers, young 
economists, and enforcers from around the world get an 
earlier access to some of the economics that’s going 
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on across a variety of topics. This year’s sponsors 
are Compass Lexecon, which will do the morning session 
on two merger topics; and The Brattle Group in the 
afternoon will cover the AMEX decision and structural 
modeling.  I’m going to moderate the Structural 
Modeling panel because I had some brief exposure to it 
and really had no idea what it was.  I thought I knew 
these things, but I didn’t. It should be a very 
interesting panel. 
We’re excited to have the Economics 
Workshop.  It has been extremely useful, especially 
for the young lawyers who sometimes find themselves 
being asked to do things on cases or mergers or 
investigations and often have no idea what the senior 
people are talking about or what the economists are 
talking about.  So this is a great way to get that 
kind of exposure, and it’s also a great way, because 
of the international nature of the conference, to 
exchange some ideas on economics in the global 
setting. 
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Let’s get started with Compass Lexecon.  
David Weiskopf is going to run the first panel.  I 
hope you all enjoy it. 
Thank you. 
              * * * 
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Panel 1: Merger Remedies 
 
Moderator: 
David Weiskopf 
Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon 
 
Panelists: 
Mark Israel 
Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon 
 
Aditi Mehta 
Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Alex Okuliar 
Partner, Orrick 
 
Sonia Pfaffenroth  
Partner, Arnold &Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 
 
   * * * 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Hello.  I’m David Weiskopf 
with Compass Lexecon.  Welcome to the morning session 
of the Economics Workshop. 
We’ll begin with the first panel, which is 
Merger Remedies.  We have a distinguished group of 
panelists with us this morning including two 
economists and two attorneys.  The two economists are 
Mark Israel, Senior Managing Director at Compass 
Lexecon, and Aditi Mehta, Assistant Section Chief of 
the Economic Litigation Section of the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  The two 
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attorneys are Alex Okuliar, a Partner at Orrick, and 
Sonia Pfaffenroth, a Partner at Arnold & Porter. 
We’ve organized the session around several 
topics related to merger remedies.  We’ll start with 
an introduction and overview; then we’ll discuss 
behavioral versus structural remedies, the 
intersection of merger remedies and merger 
efficiencies; and then, time permitting, we’ll discuss 
issues in determining a divestiture buyer and ensuring 
it is an effective competitor. 
The format is going to be question-and-
answer and we welcome questions at the end of each 
topic and also at the end of the overall panel. 
We are going to begin with an introduction 
and overview of merger remedies.  Aditi, let’s start 
with what is the purpose of merger remedies. 
MS. MEHTA:  The overall purpose of merger 
remedies is to effectively and quickly address the 
competitive harm from a merger.  That requires 
determining the nature and the scope of the harm from 
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the merger and then tailoring the remedy to address 
that harm. 
As you’re crafting the remedy you really 
want to try and retain as many of the benefits and 
efficiencies from the deal as possible. 
The other thing I’d say is the goal is to 
restore the competition that’s lost from the merger, 
not to increase the competition in the market relative 
to the premerger levels. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  What are the main types of 
merger remedies? 
MS. MEHTA:  Typically, the types of merger 
remedies are put into two categories, structural and 
behavioral.  There’s also a third category that is a 
hybrid, conditions that look like behavioral remedies 
but are really put in place to make a structural 
remedy more effective.  
When people talk about structural remedies, 
they are thinking about remedies that restore the 
competitive structure of the industry.  Typically, 
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this means a divestiture of assets, which can include 
plants, retail locations, customer contracts, that are 
sold to an independent firm in the market, and that 
can either be a new firm entering the market or 
strengthening an existing competitor in the market.  
These structural remedies tend to require very little 
ongoing oversight.  
The second category is behavioral remedies.  
In behavioral remedies, the firms integrate fully, but 
then there are conditions or prohibitions put on their 
behavior or conduct.  One example is a supply 
agreement where the merged firm is required to supply 
rival firms in the market.  These are typically more 
difficult to implement and require some more ongoing 
oversight.  So for example, a requirement to supply a 
rival  may require conditions put on what price the 
merged firm can charge its rivals or how to deal with 
quality changes over time or new products. 
The third category is conditions to 
strengthen a structural divestiture.  For example, for 
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a buyer of divested assets, t to be an effective 
competitor they may need access to certain 
intellectual property (IP) that the merged firm has.  
In that case there may have to be conditions on how 
the IP is shared between the merged firm and the buyer 
of the divested assets.  These look like the 
conditions or prohibitions you may see in a behavioral 
remedy, but they’re really there to strengthen the 
structural remedy and make the independent competitor 
in the market more effective. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you very much. 
To what extent does the approach to merger 
remedies vary across jurisdiction? 
MR. OKULIAR: David, would you like me to 
address that? 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Yes, please. 
MR. OKULIAR: I’ll do a survey of 
jurisdictions around the world and focus on the most 
active ones beyond the United States.  I’ll talk a 
little bit about the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
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and Department of Justice (DOJ) but focus on DG-COMP, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, China, and South Africa. 
First, most of these jurisdictions say that 
structural relief is good.  They put it into the 
“good” bucket because of the reasons that Aditi just 
mentioned.  They typically view behavioral remedies as 
problematic except in certain limited circumstances, 
like vertical deals. 
But what’s interesting is that a recent 
survey showed that in 2017 there were 155 remedies 
globally.  Of those more than half, 52 percent, were 
behavioral or hybrid.   
So why is that?  You’ve got on the one hand 
most jurisdictions indicating that structural is the 
way to go, and divestitures in particular, for relief, 
but in fact they are actually implementing behavioral 
remedies.  So there are a few reasons.   
First, a lot of agencies are looking at 
vertical deals right now.  As we know from some of the 
high-profile litigation here in the United States, 
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there is a focus here in the United States and also in 
Europe on vertical matters. 
Another reason is that there is a big focus 
on technology deals right now and will be into the 
foreseeable future, and divestitures typically don’t 
work when you’re looking at issues like data or 
technology access.  So there are behavioral remedies 
typically imposed in those situations. 
Another reason that I find fascinating is 
that there are really two groups of enforcers around 
the world.  First, there is a group that does focus on 
structural remedies because it follows from their 
statutory mandate.  So they have competition factors 
in either their statutory mandate or their common law.  
As a consequence, they are going to be looking for 
competition solutions.  In those instances — that 
includes DG-COMP, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada — typically their remedies are more 
than 70 percent structural.  Those groups hold similar 
views. 
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There are some differences across them.  For 
example, at DG-COMP the European process is a little 
different than the U.S. process with respect to 
remedies.  Remedies tend to come at the end of the 
investigatory process.  There is a submission of 
commitments or proposed commitments, which is what 
they refer to them as in Europe, to DG-COMP.  DG-COMP 
does a market test and then, if it is satisfied that 
the commitments will address the perceived competitive 
harm, it will grant conditional clearance for the deal 
subject to finding a purchaser for it in a divestiture 
circumstance.  Then there will be a submission of 
proposed purchasers and there is a review of the 
purchaser to determine if they have characteristics 
that would lead to success — independence, financial 
ability, operational capabilities, and the like — and 
then a final decree is issued allowing for the 
purchase to be consummated. 
As a result, as compared to the United 
States, fix-it-first remedies are actually very rare 
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in the rest of the world.  Again, a recent survey 
showed that in the United States fifteen of twenty-one 
divestiture remedies were some form of fix-it-first, 
which means that the potential buyer was identified 
upfront by the parties and the agency; only six out of 
seventeen were fix-it-first in Europe or could be 
characterized as fix-it-first, six out of fourteen in 
the United Kingdom; and I’ll talk about China in a 
little bit. 
Also within this first group of 
jurisdictions that tend to focus on structural 
remedies, where they do look at behavioral remedies in 
recent years they’ve been tending to accept behavioral 
remedies earlier in the investigation cycle, in Phase 
1 typically.  What that suggests to me is that many of 
the issues are relatively easily resolved or relate to 
what I said before, a focus on vertical deals or on 
technology deals where something as simple as a 
firewall might remedy the competitive concern. 
Where an investigation in these nations goes 
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into Phase 2 and is a more in-depth investigation, 
it’s very unlikely that a behavioral remedy will 
ultimately be used.  In the last year I don’t believe 
any such remedies have been passed at the European 
Commission or the United Kingdom.  In the United 
States, overall I think 91 percent or better of 
remedies are divestitures.  
That’s the first group of enforcers. 
There is a second group of enforcers that 
have a different statutory or common-law mandate in 
their countries that include public-interest factors 
or other types of market factors.  This group includes 
China, South Africa, some of the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries in 
Africa.  They have tended to use more nontraditional 
forms of remedies. 
China, for example, has frequent behavioral 
remedies, oftentimes to protect for instance a 
domestic player or some other issue or concern with 
the national market.  Last year, six of seven remedies 
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were behavioral in China.  There were three 
divestitures and only one of the three was a fix-it-
first. 
Some of the behavioral remedies that we’ve 
seen come out of China over the last several years 
have been supply agreements with Chinese domestic 
companies; IP licenses; there have been long-term 
hold-separate agreements that were put in place under 
consent decrees that have proven pretty controversial 
outside of China.  Seagate/Samsung is a good example 
of that, if folks are familiar with it or want to look 
it up, the combination of two hard-disk drive 
manufacturers.  The deal was allowed through, but the 
parties were told they had to keep the operations 
separately, and they ultimately were, I think, allowed 
to integrate about four years later.  Last year there 
was a similar consent with a two-year automatic 
expiration date on it. 
There have also been divestitures.  In 
Glencore/Xstrata, which was a large mining deal, there 
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was a divestiture of a Peruvian copper mine to some 
Chinese investors because there was a concern about 
supply of copper for the technology industry. 
These are relatively nontraditional remedies 
that we’ve seem come out of the Ministry of Commerce 
of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) over the 
last several years, now the State Administration for 
Market Regulation (SAMR). 
South Africa also accounts for a lot of what 
I think would be viewed as nontraditional remedies.  
There is also a broader public-interest mandate for 
the Competition Authority.  They are very focused on 
employment in South Africa.  One of the first examples 
of that was the Walmart/Massmart deal, where they did 
impose certain job and employment requirements on the 
parties.  Out of the 155 remedies that I mentioned in 
this survey last year, thirty-four were from South 
Africa and were focused primarily on jobs. 
That’s my survey of the world. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you, Alex.  Very 
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thorough.  Much appreciated. 
So, Alex, are there certain types of mergers 
or industries that are more conducive to theoretically 
sound and practically feasible remedies than others?  
MR. OKULIAR:  Yes, there certainly are, but 
I think the predicate question is: what constitutes 
effectiveness for purposes of a remedy?  What’s the 
right metric? 
The International Competition Network (ICN), 
which has done a really great job in bringing nations 
together to talk about merger remedies and in putting 
forward best practices, has identified four factors 
that I think are pretty compelling that folks should 
keep in mind in determining whether a remedy is 
effective. 
• First, does the remedy have a 
comprehensive or will it have a comprehensive impact 
on the putative competitive harm?  That’s why I think 
structural remedies, such as divestitures of lines of 
business, are so heavily favored, because they are 
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viewed as being comprehensive in remedying the 
potential competitive harm. 
Then you would look at whether there is a 
minimal risk of failure.  In that you consider the 
package that is being divested:  how high is the risk 
that the package is not viable, that you’re only 
divesting, say, a select group of assets and to 
compete in the market the buyer would need a broader 
set of assets, for example? 
Purchaser risk is another element that’s 
looked at within the overall risk-of-failure factor.  
So you look at, as I mentioned earlier, whether a 
purchaser has the financial wherewithal, the 
operational capability, the managerial experience; 
their independence and intent to compete have been 
very important, at least in my time at the agencies; 
and also that the purchaser doesn’t themselves present 
an antitrust issue in the purchase, so there isn’t a 
huge overlap, for example, or a vertical issue. 
There is also implementation risk, some of 
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which is outside of the control of the agency and the 
parties — that would include for example macroeconomic 
conditions changing — or creating bad incentives as a 
consequence of the divestiture or the remedy that 
would incentivize the parties or third parties not to 
compete in the market or to circumvent the remedy in 
some way.  That’s factor 2, the risk of failure. 
Number 3 would be practicality.  One of the 
things that has bedeviled a lot of remedies in years 
past — there was actually just a paper on this about 
six months ago — is complexity in the remedy.  For 
example, because in Halliburton/Baker Hughes there 
were twenty-three markets at issue, the DOJ ultimately 
I think decided that there really wasn’t a workable 
solution, there wasn’t a workable fix there, because 
it would be so complex.  So a practical, 
straightforward solution is viewed as a way to be 
effective in remedies. 
And then the fourth factor is the 
appropriate duration.  For some remedies, as Aditi 
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mentioned, you’ll have behavioral remedies that are 
associated with or support structural remedies for 
limited periods of time.  So it’s knowing how to gauge 
the length of time, the duration, that the remedy is 
put into place for. 
Ultimately, the bottom-line question you’re 
asking is: Does the remedy package maintain or restore 
competition to premerger levels and does it create the 
right incentives for competitors in the market to 
compete after the deal? 
With all of that in mind, I would say that 
in my experience obviously horizontal deals, where you 
can divest a line of business easily, where there 
aren’t big brand implications to divesting the 
subsidiary or the division, are going to be the ones 
that are going to be the most successful typically. 
I’ve seen those in the energy sector in oil 
and gas; I’ve seen it in manufacturing; chemicals; 
pharmaceuticals, where you have a pipeline drug or 
where you can shift or transfer the manufacturing 
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easily from the divestment parties to the purchaser; 
and then retail is another area where you can see a 
lot of success.  
MR. WEISKOPF: Okay, great.  Thank you so 
much. 
Before opening up for questions from the 
audience, panel members, any comments or thoughts so 
far? 
MR. ISRAEL:  I can jump in with a couple of 
thoughts on remedies generally. 
One thought I had is that it seems 
interesting to me that this topic is part of the 
Economics Workshop because one thing I find in 
practice on the side of the merging parties is that 
often the economists for the parties are heavily 
involved in the merits and debate about the merger and 
whether it’s procompetitive overall or not, but then 
when it comes to remedies the economists are often 
somewhat sidelined.  So I think it’s good that we’re 
talking about it in an economics workshop because I 
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think sometimes what happens is there is a debate 
about the deal on its face and then when it comes to 
remedies it sort of turns into horse trading a little 
bit for what’s going to be acceptable and what’s not 
and there’s not as much economic analysis. 
I think that is just a sort of plea.  It 
goes with the theme, I think, that I almost would 
rather not call them remedies.  Really what we’re 
trying to do is to restructure a deal in a way that 
would make the deal pass muster from an antitrust 
point of view, the same way deals get shaped to pass 
muster from the financial and strategic point of view 
and then there’s an antitrust process to deal with 
that part of it too. 
Generally, very early on in the process, 
probably from day one, the first time a firm calls a 
lawyer, they know the lawyer can tell them, “You’re 
probably going to need to have some sort of fix or 
you’re not.”  In my experience, these things go best 
when economists and lawyers are involved early on 
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trying to shape that in a way that makes sense.  I 
think you end up with fewer problems.  We’ll come back 
to this more, but one thought is just there probably 
needs to be more economic analysis of remedies.  
One other thing, just reacting to some of 
what Alex said, just picking up on that, one thing I 
find that happens in practice is both internationally 
and across agencies there can be interesting issues 
about these differing views on remedies and how that 
affects the outcome.  Sometimes they don’t align very 
well.  Just something else to watch out for as you’re 
working on them, so sometimes the different views that 
different international agencies have on remedies 
don’t align well. 
Just one example, in airlines there are 
airline alliances — OneWorld and Star — and these 
alliances need to get antitrust immunity.  
Historically, they obviously had to go in front of 
regulators in multiple jurisdictions.  Historically, 
in the United States, if there were specific routes, 
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say between New York and London, or something where 
people were worried about competition issues because 
the carriers that would be in an alliance would 
otherwise have competed, the United States’ approach 
to remedy that would be to allow antitrust immunity 
but to carve that route out, so the airlines can talk 
about coordinating your schedule and pricing on some 
routes but not that route.  Whereas the European 
approach tended to be to ask for some slots — “We need 
slots at Heathrow to give to other competitors” a 
chance to compete.  It creates an interesting tension.  
You end up giving sort of a double remedy for the same 
problem because there are different views. 
The same thing can happen even within the 
United States.  If you work on, for example, 
communications mergers, which have been hot, if the 
DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
are both involved, they may have different views on 
remedies.  I think a place you would see more 
behavioral remedies might be if another noncompetition 
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agency was involved.  I think, in addition to this 
international question, an interesting issue to watch 
out for is when different agencies have different 
views on what the remedies should be. 
MS. MEHTA:  I’ll just add to what Mark said 
about the role of economists in evaluating merger 
remedies.  Especially because so much of what the 
right remedy is depends on what the theory of harm is 
from the merger, there’s a really important role for 
economists in doing that.  
I’d say at the Division economists are 
involved in the remedy discussions and figuring out 
what the divestiture package has to look like, for 
example, to make for an effective competitor in the 
market, and I think it’s really important that 
economists play that role.  
MS. PFAFFENROTH:  I would add from the 
practitioner perspective that, building on what Aditi 
and Mark said about effective remedies and what’s 
going to be necessary to remedy a concern, there can 
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be a tendency on the part of business to want to 
approach a remedy negotiation with the government like 
one would approach a business negotiation, saying, 
“Well, if you say one plant and I say three plants, 
then two plants is clearly the correct answer.  That’s 
where the effective remedy is.” 
But from the perspective of the agency what 
they should be  trying to do is convince the agency 
that in fact what is being offered as a part of that 
divestiture package or that asset package or the 
business that is being proposed to be spun off is in 
fact going to be effective, meaning, as Aditi said, 
that it’s going to maintain the competition that 
exists in the market premerger. 
Helping businesses to understand that it has 
to be approached from that perspective to be 
persuasive to the agency is something that’s important 
because it’s more in terms of explaining why it is 
that this specific divestiture is going to be able to 
maintain competition, as opposed to trying to find 
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some reasonable middle ground from the perspective of 
simple negotiation.  
MR. WEISKOPF: Any audience questions or 
comments before we move on to the next topic?  And as 
I said, there will be an opportunity at the end as 
well for any questions or comments. 
[No response] 
Moving on to the next topic, which is 
focusing on behavioral versus structural remedies in 
particular, Sonia, what is the difference between 
those two types of remedies and why do antitrust 
enforcement agencies tend to favor structural remedies 
over behavioral remedies? 
MS. PFAFFENROTH:  Aditi explained at the 
beginning that you can separate different types of 
remedies into a structural bucket or a behavioral 
bucket.   
If you’re talking about the structural 
bucket, what you’re thinking about is what you think 
of as a stereotypical remedy in a horizontal merger 
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case, so a merger between competitors, which is 
changing the structure of the transaction to eliminate 
some competitive overlap.  That may be by selling off 
tangible assets, by spinning off a standalone 
business, by selling overlapping IP, by looking at 
pipeline drugs.  But it’s a question of looking at 
changing the structure of the transaction such that 
whatever competitive concern is created by the 
combination is mitigated by the remedy that’s being 
imposed. 
In the context of a structural remedy, the 
agencies typically have a preference for a standalone 
business.  That certainly is not possible in all 
situations, but that goes to what Alex was saying: how 
effective is this remedy going to be?  The concern is 
going to be if you are taking simply assets and giving 
them to another market participant or someone who is 
not currently a market participant, are they going to 
be able to compete with those assets in a way that one 
of the merging parties would have been able to do 
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premerger?   
Because of that preference overall for a 
standalone business, there’s also more resistance to 
mix-and-match type remedies or overly complex remedies 
that are taking pieces of both businesses — and I 
think you could see this in what was said about the 
Halliburton/Baker Hughes merger — creating a very 
complex remedy gives the government less comfort that 
that divestiture is going to in fact remedy the harm 
that they have identified from the merger. 
On the behavioral side, this can encompass a 
fairly wide range of merger conditions — Aditi talked 
about supply agreements — basically in a behavioral 
remedy you’re talking about something that is going to 
change the conduct or the behavior of the merged 
entity post-merger in some way.  It may be a question 
of restricting conduct that they might otherwise have 
undertaken, it may be a question of compelling conduct 
that they would not otherwise have chosen to take, but 
in some way it is changing the ability of the merged 
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entity to operate post-merger. 
This is something that is frequently seen in 
vertical mergers, as Alex said, because in a vertical 
merger there may be no structural remedy; because you 
have two companies that are in fact not competing, it 
doesn’t have that stereotypical overlap where you take 
the overlap away and you remedy the concern. 
Types of behavioral remedies can include: 
• As Aditi said, supply agreements of some 
typically limited duration to allow a divestiture 
buyer to be able to put itself in a position to 
replace the competition that was lost.   
• It could be a question of firewalls.  In a 
vertical case, if you have a manufacturer acquiring a 
supplier, like was the case in the FTC’s recent 
Northrop Grumman/ Orbital ATK merger, there can be 
concerns about information flow.  If that supplier is 
still doing business with competitors of the acquirer, 
the agency may be concerned about flow of proprietary 
information. 
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• Nondiscrimination provisions.  Similarly, 
if a manufacturer is acquiring a supplier, maybe it’s 
one of very few suppliers, and there is a limited 
opportunity for competitors to the acquirer to be able 
to get that component, then the agency may look for 
nondiscrimination provisions to ensure that  inputs in 
the future will be supplied in a nondiscriminatory 
manner, that the competitors aren’t going to be cut 
off from necessary inputs. 
• There could be future licensing 
requirements if there is, for example, a history of 
licensing a certain IP, to ensure that going forward 
licensing is done of fair, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms. 
• Anti-retaliation provisions.  For example, 
you could have a provision that says, “Well, if your 
customers purchase from a competitor in the future, 
you can’t retaliate against them” or “You can’t 
retaliate for reporting potential violations to the 
government.” 
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• And of course supply agreements could also 
have restrictions on contracting saying “The business 
can’t enter into X type of exclusivity.” 
So there is a wide range of types of remedy 
that can be imposed that would fall into that 
behavioral bucket. 
From things the other panelists have already 
said, the reason why there is a preference on the part 
of the agency for structural remedies, notwithstanding 
the fact that behavioral remedies may often be seen as 
a part or a whole of a remedy in a given transaction, 
is that there is that certainty that there’s a 
separation between the merged entity and the 
divestiture buyer, there aren’t restrictions on future 
conduct.   
That’s not to say that a structural remedy 
itself can’t be challenging, because it can be, in 
terms of identifying what all the necessary assets are 
going to be for a divestiture buyer to be able to 
compete; in terms of finding a feasible buyer that is 
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going to have the same incentives to compete, as Alex 
was saying; that is going to have the ability and the 
experience to be able to compete in the way that one 
of the merged parties would have. 
But, all of that said, a structural remedy 
is still something that is definitive in terms. 
When you have a behavioral remedy, you have 
something that is in fact controlling the competitive 
conduct of a business going forward.  That presents 
enforcement challenges.  It requires ongoing 
monitoring to make sure, for example, firewalls are 
being maintained; to determine whether contract terms 
really are nondiscriminatory.  It can be challenging 
on the part of the agency to draft that type of remedy 
because it is forward-looking and trying to set out 
restrictions that will achieve the goals of the remedy 
while not being overly restrictive because that could 
negatively impact the efficiencies of the transaction 
because the remedy is distorting competition in the 
market to a certain extent.  The agency is also 
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interested in avoiding loopholes, to avoid the 
possibility that the merging parties can end-run 
around the intent of the remedy and thereby not 
achieve what the government is looking for in terms of 
a remedy. 
There is always going to be a challenge 
inherent if you are putting constraints on how a 
business will compete in terms of particularly a 
dynamic market — if the market changes, maybe it gets 
beyond what that constraint was, maybe the constraint 
is no longer necessary and maybe the constraint is 
overly restrictive. 
And they are of limited duration.  Unlike a 
divestiture in which you sell the business, the 
business is gone, the business is conducted by someone 
else, behavior remedies necessarily are going to have 
a term limit. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you very much. 
Also, any comments on the FTC Merger Remedy 
Study that relates to this topic? 
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MS. PFAFFENROTH:  The remedies study is 
quite interesting because it looked at — and this is 
following on a previous study — all of the merger 
orders between 2006 and 2012.  There were eighty-nine 
in total.  It assessed whether those merger remedies 
were successful.  Some were, some were not, but for 
the most part they found that the remedies were 
successful. 
I think particularly interesting to the 
discussion of structural versus behavioral remedies is 
that, unlike the previous study, which did not look at 
vertical mergers, there were four vertical mergers 
with remedies that were assessed as a part of this 
remedies study.  The measure of success was whether 
competition was maintained in the market, or restored 
if that was the case after the fact, and whether there 
had been enforcement of the behavioral conditions.  In 
all four of the vertical transactions the FTC found 
that they were successful remedies. 
So I think that there can be a takeaway from 
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that that certainly it is very case-dependent, as Alex 
said, as to whether there is going to be a transaction 
that is going to be susceptible to having a successful 
remedy.   
It may be that there are transactions in 
which a successful remedy is not possible.  However, 
there is the demonstrated look-back because the FTC 
has the ability to go back and really dig into those 
transactions and get information and talk to market 
participants and find out what the effect was after 
the fact, to be able to look back and say, “Yes, in X, 
Y, Z cases these were in fact effective remedies; they 
did maintain the competition in the market, they did 
what they were supposed to.”  That is something which 
has been the case in those specific behavioral 
circumstances that were looked at. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you. 
Mark, are behavioral remedies a useful tool 
to offset expected merger harms; and, if so, can we 
systematically identify the proper circumstances and 
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types of remedy? 
MR. ISRAEL:  Sure.  I think they can be part 
of a toolkit to deal with harms that have been 
identified. 
But I guess I would say, to jump into the 
second half of your question, the way I think about it 
is — I may be overgeneralizing — I don’t think you see 
many situations in which a deal is anticompetitive on 
its face and the agencies have major concerns about 
the deal as a whole in which pure behavioral remedies 
will solve the problem — and by behavioral remedies I 
really mean situations where you think the merged firm 
has the incentive and the ability to harm competition, 
to raise prices or reduce output, and they simply 
promise not to. If you really think that sort of 
incentive and ability is created by the merger as a 
whole and you’re just trying to regulate it away by 
saying “Here’s a price regulation or something we’ll 
put on you,” that strikes me as not usually adopted 
and unlikely to work. 
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I think behavioral remedies are generally 
part of the solution when maybe you think the merger 
as a whole is generally good and has benefits but 
you’re concerned about specific aspects of the deal or 
specific segments or specific products or you can 
identify a specific place of concern. 
I think behavioral remedies, like I said, 
are likely to work really if it’s a narrow sort of 
specific targeted part of the concern and if the 
concern is relatively well defined as far as what you 
need to do, in the sense again that it means you’re 
not trying to fix an overall anticompetitive deal with 
a price regulation or something.  But also to me I 
think the most important thing in a behavioral remedy 
is it needs a clear benchmark.  Often firms will come 
and say, “We’ll promise not to raise prices.”  “Well, 
what would your prices have been absent the deal, and 
what does that even mean, and how else might you 
affect competition?”  Many firms in an industry where 
prices have been declining rapidly will come to 
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regulators and say, “We promise not to raise prices.”  
Obviously, that’s not going to get very far. 
But I think if you have a more narrowly 
targeted remedy, then you can have a benchmark.  So in 
some deals you might be concerned about competition at 
a lower-quality, low-price part of a market — say in 
telecom or something there’s a lower-end product and 
there’s a higher-end bells-and-whistles product — and 
maybe in some wireless phone merger or other merger 
that might happen there’s concern about some 
particular segment of the industry.  In that case, 
maybe you would say, “Today you offer a package that 
has 75 percent as much data at 75 percent of the price 
and we would like a commitment that you will continue 
to offer a package that has that proportion to your 
top package,” such that if the market evolves the 
remedy can change relative to a well-defined 
benchmark. 
So I think if you have that kind of narrow 
setting — here’s a set of customers, we’re worried 
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about a certain geography, we want to maintain the 
products that are offered in that geography and the 
prices relative to something else that’s being done 
where we don’t have competitive concerns — you have to 
be careful that doesn’t create strategic incentives to 
mess up all the pricing -- but if it’s a narrow enough 
part and you can define a benchmark relative to the 
broader industry or relative to other products that 
the firms sell, then I think there is some chance to 
actually be able to enforce it. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Having a flexible remedy may 
be very important in certain circumstances. 
Mark, are there instances where remedies 
other than divestiture should really be thought of as 
structural remedies? 
MR. ISRAEL:  It is interesting.  The way I 
would take that is to say it’s not obvious to me this 
is the right way to ask the question.  It’s natural to 
define structural as meaning you change the structure 
of the industry or the structure of the firm, and by 
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that we might naturally mean divestitures, and 
behaviorally you change the behavior of the firm. 
I would say is it’s not obvious to me those 
are the most interesting questions or the most 
interesting way to think about remedies.  You could 
hear a lot of this in Sonia’s answer as far as there 
are issues with both types of remedies. 
So I would slightly change the question and 
say when I think about remedies, I actually want to 
ask maybe two or three different questions rather than 
whether they are structural or behavioral. 
I think the most important first question 
is: does it require ongoing enforcement?  I’ll give 
some examples in a minute of things that maybe are not 
classically structural but don’t obviously require 
ongoing enforcement, at least not by the DOJ or the 
Antitrust Agency.  That’s important too, right?  A big 
part of the issue I think is that the antitrust 
agencies are generally not regulators, that’s sort of 
the opposite of their purpose, and so it’s natural not 
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to want to require them to be ongoing regulators.  So 
to me question number 1 is: Can you put in place and 
let it go, or does it require ongoing oversight? 
Question 2 would be: if it requires ongoing 
oversight, is there some expert agency or court or 
someone who can do that in a way that’s easier than 
the agencies?  So communications deals where the FCC 
is involved, airline deals where the Department of 
Transportation is involved, might more naturally have 
things that look behavioral but don’t require ongoing 
oversight, at least by the antitrust agencies, but 
somebody who’s more of an expert agency can do that. 
Third, and probably what I think is the 
single most important question — and it goes to what 
Sonia said exactly — is: is the remedy in the 
situation one in which the firm still has the ability 
and the incentive to harm competition and they are 
promising not to do it?  To me that’s the classic 
behavioral remedy. 
But to me the key question is really: Does 
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the remedy, whether it’s structural or not, do 
something about the ability and the incentive to harm 
competition?  I will give some examples to make that 
more concrete. 
In structural remedies these issues about 
whether there is ongoing oversight can easily be a 
problem.  As Aditi mentioned, often you have to have a 
structural remedy plus some three-year deal to 
continue to provide IP or something.  That has to be 
overseen, so now structural remedies, as Aditi said, 
are blurring over into behavioral. 
Most of the debate we always have about 
structural remedies is: do they really eliminate the 
ability and incentive to harm competition; have we 
created enough competition to fix that problem? 
So I think you’re naturally asking those 
questions about structural remedies.  I think you 
should be also asking those questions about behavioral 
remedies, or what we call behavioral, and I’ll just 
give two examples. 
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In some cases it might be there are a few 
large buyers of a product that might be harmed and the 
merging parties are able to enter into a contract with 
those buyers in advance.  Now, do we call that 
contract structural or do we call it behavioral?  I 
think what matters is that contract could be enforced 
through the courts, if they are large enough buyers, 
they have the ability to self-enforce, and we can look 
at the terms of the contract and see if it actually 
solves the ability/incentive problems that we’re 
concerned about.  So even though we might call that 
behavioral, I think we would evaluate it according to 
these same questions. 
The one other example I’ll give, which is 
topical recently, without getting into recent cases, 
is a remedy that has an arbitration provision.  Lots 
of vertical deals, but even some horizontal deals, can 
say, “If you’re worried about some specific 
competition issue, we could have an arbitrator 
evaluate that if it comes up.”  To me that one is 
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interesting in a couple ways. 
(1) Again, the agencies don’t have to be 
involved, they can use the arbitration process, so it 
is sort of self-enforcing. 
And then (2) — and this is where it has come 
up in recent deals — if the theories of harm are about 
changing relative bargaining power.  A lot of recent 
investigations are about a merger might give one side 
more bargaining power than the other side.  One 
solution to that might be to say, “We’re going to give 
the other side the ability to take things to 
arbitration if we think that the bargaining is being 
done unfairly.”  That’s a tool given to the bargaining 
of the other side. 
I don’t think we as economists yet know the 
answer perfectly to when arbitration works and when it 
doesn’t, but I would say those sorts of arbitration 
and contractual solutions ought to be evaluated in the 
same way we evaluate what I think of as other 
structural solutions and asking to what extent do they 
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fix the incentive and ability problems, as opposed to 
cabining them into these separate structural and 
behavioral buckets. 
MS. MEHTA:  To a large extent, having 
arbitration as a remedy really depends on how 
effective the arbitration can be. 
MR. ISRAEL:  Right. 
MS. MEHTA:  So it comes back to some of the 
same problems:  can you figure out what the 
competitive but-for price would have been, and that is 
going to affect the bargaining dynamic, and effective 
arbitration may not change that. 
MR. ISRAEL:  Certainly I agree and that’s 
one thing we have to think about.  I think the 
interesting cases are these cases in which the 
theories of harm are about bargaining because then the 
ability to go to arbitration is part of the bargaining 
game.  You are modeling what is the nature of the 
bargaining, so I think the cases where arbitration 
works best is where things never go to arbitration.  
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It’s not the ability of the arbitrator to find a 
perfect solution.   
You do have to have an arbitrator who’s not 
inherently biased, but if the arbitrator is not 
inherently biased, then the expectation of both 
parties is “If we go to arbitration we’ll end up at 
some sort of solution.”  I mean you have to know what 
that solution would be, but they’re thinking about 
“What would happen if we go to arbitration?”  If it 
works well, I think it’s because it changes the nature 
of the bargaining game in a way that changes some of 
the incentives and abilities we are worried about. 
But that said, I don’t disagree that an 
obviously ineffective or captured arbitrator would not 
solve the problem. 
MS. MEHTA:  And I’m not just talking about a 
captured arbitrator; it’s just arbitration can be 
hard.  Figuring out what the right but-for price is a 
difficult exercise, and especially if there are 
changing conditions over time or unforeseen changes.  
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It’s not necessarily that there’s a biased arbitrator; 
it’s just that that can be a difficult exercise to 
undertake. 
MR. OKULIAR:  Going to Sonia’s point 
earlier, just having arbitration generally can place a 
burden on the parties going forward that would distort 
competition long term. 
MR. ISRAEL:  Just one comment.  I agree with 
all that.  I think it’s an interesting topic to 
discuss.  I think that’s why the standard for good 
arbitration — and it has worked pretty well in some 
FCC cases — would be arbitration that almost never 
gets used but that creates a backstop against which 
there are some bargaining concerns we might have.  It 
doesn’t force the arbitrator to find the perfect 
price; it just means each side faces some risk if they 
go to arbitration, which can create incentives to 
reach a deal. 
I think the best economic research on this 
has been done more in the IP/patent FRAND setting, 
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where bargaining in the shadow of arbitration can work 
more effectively than bargaining absent the shadow or 
arbitration, and what you hope is that that shadow 
creates the right incentives to reach a deal.  
MR. WEISKOPF:  Just a quick follow-up on 
that.  So are we talking about more of a dynamic game 
here in terms of the underlying economic theory, or is 
this more of a static negotiation where you don’t 
really contemplate sequential negotiations and 
possible arbitration along the way?  Sorry, but the 
economist in me had to ask that. 
MR. ISRAEL:  I don’t know.  Bargaining games 
are hard.  I think we generally model them in some 
static sense.   
I think, to get technical for a second, if 
you are doing a Nash bargaining model or bargaining 
models people often use, these models can admit 
outside options.  So the two sides are bargaining and 
negotiating, but with arbitration (or whatever it is) 
there can be an outside option, a way to leave the 
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bargaining game and start some other game.  So I think 
the models would be imagine two parties bargaining but 
one or both of them has some outside option to go 
invoke arbitration. 
If your question was then do we add to that 
multiple rounds of negotiations with different parties 
each of whom may arbitrate, I’d love to, but I don’t 
think the economics of bargaining is that advanced. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Fair enough.  Yes, I think we 
tend to revert to static models for a lot of the work 
that we do. 
Any other panel comments? 
MR. OKULIAR:  Just one last quick comment 
while we’re talking about these different structural 
versus behavioral remedies. 
I thought one of the things that was 
interesting that came out of the FTC’s merger 
retrospective remedies study was that it looks like 
100 percent of the line-of-business divestitures they 
deemed successful; 100 percent of the vertical 
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behavioral remedies were deemed successful, but 
roughly a third of the sale-of-asset divestitures were 
deemed unsuccessful, so only two-thirds were 
successful.  That points to a lot of potential issues, 
a lot of risk associated with those types of asset 
divestitures. 
It also points to the informational 
asymmetry that I think, Sonia, you were referring to, 
on the part of the agency staff.  They are excellent 
in their jobs, but they’re not market participants, 
they have a limited window into what is going to 
potentially work going forward in the market, and so 
when you have staff actually working with the parties 
to structure a deal, trying to guess which assets are 
the right ones that are going to be viable, I think 
that has been at least shown in this one study to be 
potentially problematic. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Fair enough. 
Shifting gears a little bit, we are going to 
talk about the intersection of merger remedies and 
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merger efficiencies. 
Aditi, what is the relationship between 
merger remedies and merger efficiencies and how does 
it vary according to the type of merger remedy and 
efficiency? 
MS. MEHTA:  The goal of merger remedies is 
to address the competitive harm but retain as many of 
the efficiencies of the deal as possible.  
In some cases crafting a remedy that retains 
the efficiencies can be as straightforward exercise.  
You can imagine there’s a merger between two companies 
that have plants all across the country but the only 
overlap between the two companies is, let’s say, in 
the middle of the country, and so you are worried 
about local customers who are purchasing in that part 
of the country.  The efficiencies in that deal may be 
something like increasing the distribution network of 
the merged firm, which may allow them to better serve 
national customers or reduce their transportation cost 
let’s say. 
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In that case you can imagine crafting a 
remedy where the merged firm has to divest some of the 
overlap assets in the middle of the country.  That 
still allows them to retain the efficiencies from the 
deal, the broader distribution network, but does 
remedy the competitive harm. 
When we’re thinking about crafting a remedy 
we’re thinking about how the efficiencies of the deal 
are affected.  But we’re not only thinking about the 
efficiencies to the merged firm.  We also think about 
creating an effective competitor that can restore 
premerger competition: what about the efficiencies to 
the purchaser of the divested assets? 
In this example, the purchaser of the 
divested assets is only going to get the plants in the 
middle of the country.  Does that put it at a 
disadvantage relative to the merged firm in a way that 
would not allow them to effectively compete and 
restore premerger competition? 
When we’re thinking about the efficiencies, 
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we’re thinking about for the merged firm post-remedy 
can they still get some of the efficiencies from the 
deal but also thinking about are we making an 
effective competitor with the assets that are being 
divested. 
I think those are at least two ways that we 
think about the interplay between merger efficiencies 
and merger remedies. 
There are more complicated cases where it is 
not going to be as simple to retain the benefits of 
the deal and still address the competitive harm.   
For example, you can think of a case where 
the merged firm uses the same assets both for the 
product where there is an overlap and for products 
where there is not an overlap and add to the 
efficiencies from the deal.  In cases like that it is 
going to be harder to craft a remedy that both 
addresses the competitive harm and retains a lot of 
the benefits of the deal or the efficiencies. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you. 
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Mark, should the goal of remedies be to 
restore premerger conditions or to maximize consumer 
welfare considering the effect of merger efficiencies?  
Which of these goals do the enforcement agencies tend 
to focus on? 
MR. ISRAEL:  I think they focus on both, at 
least in theory.  I guess this is a question where at 
least as economists — I’ll make an extreme version of 
the statement — I think most economists would agree 
that the goal ultimately should be to craft a deal 
that maximizes consumer welfare, but in practice the 
focus ends up probably a lot more on whether the deal 
restores premerger competition. 
This probably goes to a whole different 
panel that has been done and will be done again about 
the relative weight that harms and efficiencies 
receive in merger review, but I certainly think it’s 
true that there can be a tendency — remedies are 
complicated, as Aditi said, and there can be a 
tendency when they get complicated to focus more — if 
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there is one of these situations in which there is a 
tradeoff between the efficiencies and the harms and 
they’re happening in similar places, I think there can 
be a tendency to focus more on “Let’s make sure we 
restore the premerger conditions and not think as much 
about the efficiencies.”  
This really comes up — again I’ll say more 
from what I know, which is the private party side — 
there are lots of cases I’ve been involved in where 
there is one workstream which is evaluating the merger 
and arguing for the efficiencies from the merger and 
why the merger is good, and then there is a separate 
workstream that is happening on what the remedy should 
be.  In some of those cases maybe I as the economist 
would be heavily involved in the first workstream but 
not in the second, and so then you get to see the 
remedy package that is being proposed later in the 
process and it sort of entirely undoes all of the 
efficiencies that you’re arguing for, it divests all 
of the assets that are central to those efficiencies. 
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That’s part of my appeal earlier, working 
with the private parties and working with the 
agencies, is to have the economists more involved. I 
actually agree with what Aditi said earlier; it seems 
to me that the economists at the agencies are 
generally pretty involved in the remedy discussions, 
but Aditi can probably say that at the meetings she 
goes to that have the least economists from the 
parties are the remedy discussions.  I think that one 
thing that could happen there on both sides is the 
efficiencies part of the story can get lost. 
An example is airline mergers.  I’ve work on 
a bunch of airline mergers.  This is a classic case in 
which the core efficiency of a good airline merger 
would be bringing two airline networks together to 
create more connectivity and a bigger airline network.  
The key to that happening is that you bring these two 
networks together.  But the key to bringing these two 
airline networks together, the tie that binds those 
networks together, is going to be a small set of 
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routes that connect their hubs.  The ideal merger 
would be one airline on one side of the country and 
one on the other and they’re connected by one route 
through the middle.  That route is going to be the key 
to the efficiencies from the deal and it is also going 
to be the focus of the potential harms from the deal.  
I don’t have a perfect solution here.  I 
would just hope that the benefit and the harm side get 
discussed.  Probably it does in airlines, but in other 
deals the focus will just be more “We’ve got to fix 
that harm and the efficiencies be damned.” 
One other thing, building on what Aditi 
said.  I do think it is a common question on this 
efficiencies-versus-harms question — and it’s 
something we have to watch out for — is the 
efficiencies come from economies of scale.   
This is another two workstreams thing that 
happens.  One workstream says you can develop the 
arguments that economies of scale are the key and 
that’s the source of efficiencies.  The other 
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workstream says develop the argument that a remedy 
that starts some new entrant will be a full fix to 
competition.  There is obviously tension there 
potentially in terms of whether the scale economies 
are required or not. 
One thing that often helps me reconcile 
these is that I think the right way to think about 
that is that you are trying to recreate the smaller or 
the acquired firm.  So it can be the case that the 
merged firm can gain efficiencies from scale but still 
recreate a firm that’s not in a worse position than 
the smaller of the two of them was at the beginning in 
an ideal case. 
But again that’s a place where I agree the 
efficiencies versus the harms can come into tension.  
I don’t have a perfect answer, except to say if your 
efficiencies are going to be credible and if this is 
going to work, you better be thinking about that 
interplay from the beginning. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you. 
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Alex, are there specific industries or types 
of mergers or remedies where the two goals are likely 
to diverge the most — that is the two goals (1) 
restoring premerger conditions and (2) maximizing 
consumer welfare? 
MR. OKULIAR:  I think there are certainly 
types of remedies where these two goals can diverge, 
mostly behavioral remedies.   
In a lot of technology deals that involve 
either data or intellectual property or other types of 
access to technology as part of a remedy, you have a 
situation where there is potentially a temporal 
mismatch, where you have short-term increases in 
efficiencies as a consequence of giving competitors 
access to, for example, data or standard-essential 
patents or other intellectual property; but over the 
long term there can be a chilling effect on innovation 
that can harm efficiencies over the long term and it 
can harm consumer welfare over the longer term.  I 
think those types of remedies most likely tend to be 
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problematic. 
I would also look at remedies where there is 
an attempt by the agencies, as I mentioned earlier 
with respect to the asset divestitures or single-asset 
divestitures, to improve the market, where you see 
agency staff or the parties working to better the 
market and to move it to a new level.  You can end up 
with significant implementation risk and failed 
remedies that ultimately harm consumer welfare. 
So those are two. 
And then Sonia mentioned horse trading or 
negotiation.  That kind of falls into the same bucket 
as the single-asset divestitures, where you have the 
agency staff and the parties negotiating back and 
forth and they say, “Oh, we’ll just go for the middle 
between the two of us.”  That’s also a situation where 
you could have a mismatch between these two ends. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Excellent.  Thank you. 
Any other panel comments before we move on 
to the last topic? 
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MS. PFAFFENROTH:  I would just add to what 
Alex said that I think another situation in which you 
may see a divergence and in which remedies can be 
challenging are where you’re looking at a transaction 
that has effects in both upstream and downstream 
markets.  If you’re looking to remedy harm downstream, 
what’s the effect upstream, are you reducing 
efficiencies upstream, and how do you then weigh what 
the effect is on the overall procompetitive aspects of 
the transaction, on trying to remedy harm in one of 
those two markets? 
As Alex said also, in evolving markets, 
dynamic markets, you’re imposing a remedy, you’re 
looking forward, you’re trying to see where that 
market is going to go, and it may be, particularly in 
the context of a behavioral remedy, that the remedy is 
constraining that evolution in some way that might 
work against the overall goals of the remedy. 
Going back to some of the things that Mark 
was saying earlier on, the remedies and the 
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efficiencies that you can realize from a transaction 
are necessarily going to be intertwined.  If you’re 
imposing a remedy, if you’re changing some aspect of 
the transaction, whether it’s by imposing a structural 
remedy and spinning off assets that would otherwise 
have been able to be used synergistically between the 
two entities, it may be that the synergies are 
particularly significant because in fact there were 
significant overlaps.  So there may be a tension 
between the remedy and the overall efficiencies of a 
transaction. 
But whether it’s a structural remedy where 
you’re selling off a piece of what would have 
otherwise given rise to synergies in the transaction 
or if it’s a behavioral remedy where there’s an 
ongoing restraint on some aspect of the merged 
entity’s ability to compete that is distorting the 
market that is changing incentives going forward, it 
is necessary to separate that from what the 
efficiencies would have been had the parties simply 
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been able to combine the two companies.  Any remedy is 
likely to have some effect on efficiencies, a negative 
effect diminishing the efficiencies. 
I think that what that also highlights is 
how important it is to narrowly tailor remedies in 
merger cases to make sure that the remedy isn’t 
broader than it needs to be to address the harm 
because the broader the remedy the more impact it has 
on the efficiencies of a transaction. 
That’s not to say that there may not be 
situations in a structural remedy where there is a 
manufacturing facility and it is shared by more than 
one product and only one of the products is an 
overlap, but you cannot set up a divestiture unless 
you spin off that asset, that is going to have an 
impact that is broader than necessarily what is 
absolutely required to address the overlap in the 
transaction.  It may be necessary, but it is going to 
have therefore further effects on efficiencies. 
So where it is possible, particularly in the 
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case of behavioral remedies where you are changing the 
competitive dynamic, to cabin that, to make it narrow, 
as Mark said earlier, that is going to be a more 
effective remedy.  Where it is easily definable and 
there are parameters around it and you can cabin it, 
that’s going to affect the efficiency of a transaction 
less. 
MR. ISRAEL:  Just one last comment.  I think 
one place sometimes we get in trouble and lose sight 
of this balance is when remedies are designed to hit 
some structural screen that we’re worried about.  
I’m not even sure the agencies want to do 
this, but a lot of parties come in and say, “Compute 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in every local 
market and we need to spin off anyplace the HHI post-
merger is over 2500”; or they will say in telecom 
deals, “There’s some spectrum screen and we’ve crossed 
that”; or you get calls saying, “Compute every local 
market and find where all the Upward Pricing Pressures 
(UPPs) are above 5 percent and we’ll form a 
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divestiture that way.”  I’m not even sure the agencies 
are that structural.  Sometimes it’s the firms 
themselves that want that kind of certainty upfront, 
and you’ll say, “(a) that’s not a great way to design 
a remedy and (b) it probably doesn’t even give you the 
certainty that you want.” 
But on both sides I think when it’s purely 
structural and it’s like “Let’s just hit an HHI limit” 
is the place I see we lose sight of this balance. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Fair enough. 
I think we are going to have time for the 
last topic.  We want to talk about the issues in 
determining a divestiture buyer and ensuring it’s an 
effective competitor. 
Let’s start, Sonia, with some of the 
characteristics that antitrust enforcement agencies 
look for in a potential divestiture buyer. 
MS. PFAFFENROTH:  A lot of this goes back to 
what Alex already covered when he was talking about 
what it takes to make an effective remedy. 
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If an agency is looking at a divestiture 
buyer, it wants to make sure that that buyer is 
financially stable; it wants to make sure that it is 
going to stay in the market, that it has the ability 
to compete the assets.  Something the agencies may 
look at is to see whether that divestiture buyer is 
going to require financing from the merging parties, 
which affects the view of the financial stability and 
the ability to compete. 
The agencies will look at the potential 
divestiture buyer’s experience in the specific product 
market that the spinoff business is in or the spinoff 
assets are related to, or in a similar market product 
or a similar geographic market, to determine whether 
that buyer has the experience and the ability to be 
able to take what it is getting as a part of the 
divestiture package and be able to compete it as it 
would have been competed, as it was being competed by 
the company that is selling it off. 
Again, that goes back to the points that 
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Alex was making previously about the divestiture of a 
standalone businesses being typically a divestiture 
that is going to be a successful remedy, with asset 
divestitures having mixed results.  In the latter 
case, it may be difficult to identify the assets that 
are going to be necessary.   
Where an agency has an upfront buyer that 
has already been identified, then the asset package 
can be more tailored to what that specific divestiture 
buyer is going to need.  If you’re thinking in the 
abstract, maybe they need a distribution network, but 
maybe the actual divestiture buyer doesn’t need the 
distribution network, it has its own distribution 
network.  So that would be an overly broad remedy to 
put in place. 
It doesn’t necessarily need to be a current 
competitor in the market or an adjacent market.  
Financial buyers that have industry experience, that 
have individuals working with them that have 
experience in that industry, can be very successful 
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divestiture buyers as well.  So it’s holistically 
looking at the potential buyer to see whether they 
have the characteristics, the experience, that is 
going to be necessary for them to - in the agency’s 
view - hit the ground running, not require a huge 
ramp-up, be able to put the assets into play or the 
business into play before it starts to deteriorate. 
I think it’s again important, as Alex said, 
to make sure, particularly if you are looking at an 
existing competitor, a strategic buyer, to not be 
creating competitive concerns through the divestiture 
that would not exist if you were looking at a 
divestiture buyer that is not already a part of the 
market.  So that’s something the agencies will look 
at. 
But it’s really a question of assessing the 
divestiture buyer’s ability and incentives to be able 
to compete.  That may be informed by the price at 
which they are getting the divestiture package.  Is 
the price so low that they wouldn’t necessarily have 
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to compete quite as aggressively or in the same way?  
Is there an incentive to liquidate the assets going 
down the road?  All of these are things that are going 
to be considered because the agency wants to make 
certain that that divestiture buyer is going to stay 
in the market and be successful. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you. 
Mark, is it problematic if the buyer 
acquires ongoing support from the seller? 
MR. ISRAEL:  It can be.  I think Aditi 
referenced this right up-front, about this 
intermediate case where there has to be some ongoing 
oversight.  Obviously, there is a potential concern — 
and it happens a lot — when as part of the divestiture 
package there will be some sort of sales support or 
training or there is some ramp-up period.  That’s 
often how things are structured, that there will be 
some sort of eighteen- or twenty-four-month ramp-up 
period until the new divestiture buyer can be fully 
on-the-ground running that they require ongoing 
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support from the seller.  Obviously, if they are 
competing in the same market, that creates some room 
for mischief. 
I think what it does really is just mean, as 
I said earlier, that this distinction between 
structural and behavioral all gets blurry — and Aditi 
said this too — and there is this behavioral piece to 
the structural remedy. 
Ultimately I would evaluate it the same way 
as I did before.  If what you’re saying is you are 
going to set up a divestiture buyer but that 
divestiture buyer is going to need an intense amount 
of support across large aspects of what it does 
because it’s really new to the business, then maybe 
that’s not going to work.  If it’s something where you 
can have more of a well-defined kind of benchmark that 
they are able to do X, Y and Z and you need to provide 
them support just in one additional thing, you can 
define the parameters of that and make sure that 
they’re hitting certain targets as far as what costs 
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they are able to obtain and things, then maybe it’s 
something that could work. 
But I think we almost certainly have to 
recognize that that’s going to require at least some 
period of ongoing regulatory oversight because there 
would otherwise be at least a potential incentive to 
harm competition. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you. 
Aditi, let’s think about a merger of two 
retailers.  What sort of impediments might a 
divestiture buyer face in trying to be an effective 
competitor in that sort of setting? 
MS. MEHTA: I think if you’re looking at this 
type of merger you would do what we do when we’re 
evaluating any potential remedies: Think about the 
full set of assets that the buyer needs.  As part of 
that process you speak to potential buyers of the 
divested asset, other industry participants, look at 
business plans. 
For a retailer there may be other things, 
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like distribution assets, that are important to the 
retailer that they may not already have.  If it’s a 
merger of retailers, the purchaser of the divested 
asset has to be someone who is not going to create 
their own anticompetitive issue, as has been 
mentioned.  But that may mean that they’re not very 
large and they don’t have the distribution assets that 
they need to run a larger retail facility.  So that 
may be one thing that would need to be added to the 
set of divestiture assets to make an effective 
competitor. 
There are more generally other things that 
can be included in the set of divested assets, like 
personnel or sales and marketing capabilities, supply 
contracts, service contracts. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Great.  Thank you. 
Let’s consider a different setting.  Let’s 
say two intermediate manufactured good suppliers.  
Alex, in that sort of situation or industry setup, 
what sort of impediments might a divestiture buyer 
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face? 
MR. OKULIAR:  Without repeating some of the 
factors that we’ve already discussed. 
Specifically with respect to intermediate 
manufactured goods suppliers, they’re going to be 
thinking about things like: first of all, is it a 
line-of-business sale or is it just an asset sale; if 
it’s just an asset sale, do we have all the requisite 
assets in order to compete?   
The concerns also depend in part on whether 
they are a non-industry buyer or an industry buyer.  
They may be able as an industry buyer to pick up a few 
assets and be able to compete right out of the gate. 
Another thing is: during the interim period 
is there a degradation of the assets that are being 
held by the divestment party, and was there a failure 
by that party to maintain those assets during the 
hold-separate period and the period pre-final order?  
Was there a loss of key personnel?  That’s 
another huge issue.  Are the best people leaving the 
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business being divested or are the best people 
leaving, say, the manufacturing facility that’s coming 
over to you?  That is particularly an issue if you’re 
a non-industry buyer because it is going to be harder 
for you to replace those folks; you just don’t have 
the network and the contacts to be able to replace 
people as easily or quickly. 
Sharing of confidential information with the 
divestment party.  If the divestment party knows all 
your costs and knows everything about your 
manufacturing facility and they’re still going to be 
in the general area competing with you or potentially 
competing with you, that’s going to be a big issue.  
So you’re going to want to be looking out for that. 
I think probably the biggest issue for folks 
in intermediate manufactured goods is: are they able 
to maintain their customer and supplier relationships?  
That’s particularly key if you’re a non-industry 
buyer.  There are oftentimes change-of-control 
provisions.  Customers or suppliers might try to 
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renegotiate terms with you; they might try to 
negotiate more favorable deals for themselves just to 
keep you in business.  So that is another big issue 
that is I think fairly specific to this particular 
scenario. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Great.  Thank you. 
Before we open it up for any audience 
comments or questions, panelists, any final thoughts 
or comments? 
MS. PFAFFENROTH:  I would just say — and 
this piggybacks on everything that Aditi and Alex were 
just saying about what all the concerns may be in 
those specific sectors to determine what’s going to 
make for an effective remedy — you can have the 
perfect divestiture package that has everything in it, 
that has everything in it that would alleviate the 
competitive overlaps, that should set up a standalone 
competitor.  If you don’t have the right divestiture 
buyer, that package isn’t going to be enough.   
So it is both identifying everything that a 
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buyer is going to need — and if you know who the buyer 
is, that helps you tailor it to that specific buyer to 
ensure success — but it really is a question of if you 
put the package together, is there another company, is 
there a financial buyer, that is going to be able to 
take that package and be able to sustain competition 
in the market with it? 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you. 
Questions, comments? 
QUESTION [Cecile Wong]:  Hi. 
Alex, when you were talking about how there 
are certain countries in the world that use other 
issues than competition in their assessment you left 
out the United States, where some mergers get reviewed 
by the FCC and they also have a public-interest 
standard. 
MR. OKULIAR:  Right. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Wong]: One of the things 
that Sprint and T-Mobile are going to come in with is 
this notion that if allowed to merge they would be 
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able to deploy 5G faster.  I’m trying to figure out 
how smarter people in the antitrust world assess that 
claim and if there’s anything you can say about it. 
Are there divestitures that could fix the 
problem?  We saw that four to three got rejected by 
the Department of Justice just a couple of years ago. 
MR. OKULIAR:  I’m not sure how much I can 
say about that specific deal.  But I would say that in 
terms of whether they’re able to bring 5G onto the 
market more quickly, that is certainly I would think — 
and I’ll turn to Mark for this — that’s certainly 
something that could be creditable as a potential 
efficiency or a gain for consumer welfare that would 
be taken into account, and it’s something that would 
not necessarily be considered a public-interest factor 
that the FCC would look at.  That’s how I would come 
at it and that’s what I would be thinking about. 
In terms of divestitures, I really don’t 
know.  Certainly in these types of deals you will see 
divestitures of bandwidth, of spectrum, that go along 
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with these deals to help facilitate competition in the 
market and replace the lost competition. 
Anything else, Mark? 
MR. ISRAEL:  I’ll try to refrain from 
commenting too much on that deal.   
I agree there is this interesting question 
of other things that come to FCC.  I think the 5G 
question would be evaluated as a real competition 
merger efficiency.  I do think it is potentially a 
good example of where divestitures of spectrum would 
have to be considered relative to the effect they had 
on the ability to do that. 
But I do think generally there is this issue 
at FCC.  In that same deal I think there are filings 
at FCC about the effect on jobs and things. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Wong]:  Right, absolutely. 
MR. ISRAEL:  Obviously it’s a hot topic to 
what extent that interacts with antitrust and things. 
I think generally the agencies don’t think 
as much about those issues.  I think the DOJ and FCC, 
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in particular in my experience on other deals, have 
worked together pretty well to craft a unified remedy, 
and things like the effects on jobs or broader 
initiatives about the effect on independent voices or 
communications or things that the FCC takes into 
consideration are largely independent, I think, of 
what the DOJ thinks about.  I don’t think they get as 
evaluated as much.  There are cases in which they 
cause some tension with competition approach. 
But as far as your specific one about 5G, I 
agree with Alex, I think that probably should be 
evaluated.  If it happened, it would lead to higher-
quality mobile wireless networks and I imagine the DOJ 
would think hard about that. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you.  That’s a good 
question. 
Another question? 
QUESTION [Shirley Quo]:  This is directed to 
Mark.  Did I hear you correctly that you said that 
antitrust agencies are not regulators? 
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MR. ISRAEL:  I would draw a distinction 
between antitrust and regulation.  Some of this may be 
how we define the words.  My definition would be that 
regulation is ongoing oversight by an agency in 
constraining the behavior of those in an industry, 
whereas you could say antitrust is a very specific 
form of regulation, but I like to think of it as 
almost the opposite, that the role is to maintain 
market structures in a way that the market self-
regulates through competition. 
MS. MEHTA:  That’s how we view it as well. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Other questions, comments? 
QUESTION:  Would any of the members of the 
panel please elaborate a little bit more about the 
Chinese walls as remedies?  I work for the Spanish 
Competition Authority and we have a lot of trouble 
making Chinese walls actually work.  Sometimes I have 
the feeling that they are kind of away from our 
countries because we are not really sure how to make 
them work. 
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MR. ISRAEL:  This seems like a better 
question for the lawyers. 
MR. OKULIAR:  I can say simply from 
experience when I was at DOJ that we imposed firewalls 
in a couple of our consents when I was there and had 
oversight, we had someone at the agency who served as 
a monitor, and they appear to have worked. 
I think one of the difficulties with 
firewalls is that ultimately they are kind of hard for 
the agency to enforce.  They are sort of self-
enforced, so if there is information exchanged it 
would be very difficult for the agency to pick up on 
that, unless there is an immediate effect in the 
marketplace or if there is something in the 
documentation, so if the parties share documentation 
and the agency monitor sees that of course.  But that 
is a fairly unlikely scenario. 
MS. PFAFFENROTH:  Yes, and I think it goes 
to the overall enforceability and ongoing monitoring 
that’s required by different types of behavioral 
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remedies.  But for the firewalls in particular you 
will see consent decree provisions that impose a 
firewall and also compliance programs to monitor and 
make sure that they are being enforced.   
Is there a possibility that companies will 
disregard the law and be in violation of the decree?  
Certainly it is a possibility.  But I think in 
practical effect you assume and hope that companies 
that are committing to that type of decree, which is 
enforceable in a court, are putting in place the 
structures and the safeguards necessary to make sure 
that the information flow is being constrained in the 
way that it is intended to be. 
MR. ISRAEL:  I guess I will say one thing.  
I think this goes to the discussion about arbitration.  
Probably for both behavioral structural remedies none 
of them work perfectly.  Sometimes I think the debate 
will become somebody proposes a remedy — especially if 
it’s like an FCC process where there is public debate 
or litigation, a remedy is proposed, and then the 
 83 
 
 
 
 
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.       
response is kind of “Here’s all the limitations of 
that remedy, and those are true.” 
That’s why I said at the beginning I think 
you’re thinking about these things mostly in deals 
that are kind of close calls and where you see a lot 
of benefits and you’re just saying, “We hope that the 
firewall makes it harder for that behavior that we’re 
worried about” or “We hope that the arbitration pushes 
things in one direction.” 
To me the only way to think about these 
things is that they somewhat reduce the risk of things 
we’re concerned about such that the balance tips in 
favor of the efficiencies.  I think if our standard 
when we debate them becomes “Do they work entirely as 
anticipated?” we probably would end up rejecting all 
of them. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Ben? 
QUESTION [Benjamin Wagner]:  How do the 
agencies think about ownership when they’re thinking 
about divestitures?  I’m thinking about situations 
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where there are franchises, like if Domino’s and Pizza 
Hut merged or something and there was an overlap that 
the same franchisee owned.  For those two locations 
where there was overlap did those not require 
divestiture?  How do the agencies tend to think about 
those kinds of things? 
MR. OKULIAR:  I’ve been involved in one deal 
where there were franchisees and they were treated as 
being part of the company.  They were associated with 
the company.  Where there was an overlap of 
franchisees, that was considered something that might 
need to be divested. 
MS. MEHTA:  It probably depends on how 
independently they behave in how pricing works and 
things like that. 
MR. WEISKOPF:  Thank you, panelists, for a 
lively and insightful discussion. 
We’ll have a short break and then we’re 
going to pick back up with the second panel on Merger 
Retrospectives at 11 o’clock. 
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[Break: 10:48−11:00 a.m.]  
